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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DON'T TAKE YOUR
GUNS TO TOWN: MARYLAND'S GOOD-ANDSUBSTANTIAL-REASON REQUIREMENT FOR
HANDGUN PERMITS PASSES INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY - WOOLLARD V. GALLAGHER, 712 F.3D
865 (4TH CIR. 2013).
The Second Amendment declares, "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."' The Supreme Court's seminal decision in District of Columbia v. Heller2 held that the Second Amendment
secures an individual right to keep and bear firearms for the purposes of
self-defense unconnected from militia service. 3 Heller dealt only with the
principal guarantee of the Second Amendment: the right to use a firearm in
defense of one's home.4 The Court did not articulate the boundaries of the
right, such as whether it extends outside the home. In Woollard v. Gallagher,6 the Fourth Circuit considered whether Maryland's handgun regulation requiring an applicant to show a "good-and-substantial-reason" for issuance of a permit violated the Second Amendment. The Fourth Circuit
held that the "good-and-substantial-reason" requirement was constitutional
because it was reasonably tailored to Maryland's significant interests in
public safety and crime prevention.'
Maryland proscribes the carrying of a handgun, openly or concealed, outside the home without a handgun permit. 9 In order to receive a
I

amend. II.
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
3 See id. at 592 (finding Second Amendment guarantees "individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation").
4 See id. at 628-29 (recognizing need for use of firearms for self-defense is "most acute" in
one's home); see also Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (acknowledging Second Amendment rights are at "zenith within the home").
5 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (noting first detailed foray into Second Amendment cannot define entire scope of right); see also Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (remarking Supreme Court has not addressed whether Second Amendment rights extend outside the
home); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89 (describing scope of the Second Amendment as "vast 'terra
incognita"'); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 466 (4th Cir. 2011) (pointing to uncertainty surrounding Second Amendment rights beyond fundamental right recognized in Heller).
6 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013).
7 See id. at 868.
U.S. CONST.

2

8 See id. at 880.
9 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-303 (LexisNexis 2011) ("A person shall have a
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permit, an applicant must demonstrate to the Secretary of the Maryland
State Police that he or she is an adult that has not been convicted of a disqualifying crime, does not have a drug or alcohol addiction, and does not
have a propensity towards violence. 10 Additionally, the applicant must
show to the Secretary that he or she has a "good-and-substantial-reason,"
such as a "reasonable precaution against apprehended danger."11 A handgun permit lapses on the "last day of the holder's birth month following 2
years after the date the permit is issued" and may be extended for additional periods of three years if the permit holder once again demonstrates his or
her qualifications for a permit. 12
On Christmas Eve 2002, Raymond Woollard was at home with his
family when a trespasser broke into his house.13 An altercation ensued, and
Woollard's wife called the police, who took nearly three hours to arrive at
Woollard's home. 14 Woollard subsequently applied for and was granted a
handgun permit in 2003, which he renewed in 2006; however, his permit
was denied a renewal in 2009.15 Woollard and the Second Amendment

permit issued.. .before the person carries, wears, or transports a handgun."). A person carrying a
handgun without a permit risks imprisonment, a fine, or both. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4203(c) (LexisNexis 2012).
10 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(1)-(6)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). If the
Secretary finds that the applicant qualifies for a handgun permit, the Secretary is statutorily man-

dated to issue the handgun permit to the applicant. Ild.
11 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(6)(ii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). The Secretary
has designated the Handgun Permit Unit the responsibility of issuing handgun permits. See
Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 465 (D. Md. 2012). The Handgun Permit Unit is obligated to take into account during its review such factors as whether the applicant demonstrated
good and substantial reasons, available alternatives to a handgun permit, and whether a handgun
permit is reasonable to defend the permit holder against the apprehended threat. See id.; see also
MD. CODE REGS. 29.03.02.04 (2013). There are four categories that qualify as "good-andsubstantial-reason[s]:" "(1) for business activities, either at.. .business owner's request or on behalf of.. employee; (2) for regulated professions (security guard, private detective, armored car
driver, and special police officer); (3) for 'assumed risk' professions (e.g., judge, police officer,
public defender, prosecutor, or correctional officer); and (4) for personal protection." Woollard,
712 F.3d at 869-70. To qualify under the personal protection category, the applicant must show
that the permit is needed against "'apprehended danger."' Id. at 870. The Handgun Permit Unit
looks objectively at whether there is "'apprehended danger."' See Snowden v. Handgun Permit
Review Bd., 413 A.2d 295, 298 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980). An applicant who has been denied a
permit can appeal the decision to the Handgun Permit Review Board. MD. CODE ANN., PUB.
SAFETY § 5-312(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2011).
12 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-309(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2011).

13 Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 465. The trespasser was Kris Lee Abbott, Woollard's sonin-law, who was high on drugs and looking for his wife's car keys so he could go purchase more
drugs. Id.
14 ld. Abbott was sentenced to probation for the Christmas Eve incident but was later incarcerated for committing burglary and assaulting a police officer. ld.
15 Id. Woollard's application for a renewal of his handgun permit was denied because he
failed to produce a "good-and-substantial-reason" for needing a permit. ld. at 466. Woollard
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Foundation sued, claiming that Maryland's "good-and-substantial-reason"
requirement was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16
The district court found that the Second Amendment right to bear
arms is not confined to the home.1 7 The district court further found that
Maryland's "good-and-substantial-reason" requirement was unconstitutional as it failed to withstand intermediate scrutiny.18 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit overturned the "trailblazing" decision of the district court
and found that the Maryland statute passed intermediate scrutiny.1 9 The
Fourth Circuit held that the "good-and-substantial-reason" requirement was
constitutional because it advanced Maryland's substantial interests of pub20
lic safety and crime prevention.
The origins of the Second Amendment can be traced back to early
English law. 21 The English theories of firearm rights greatly influenced the
offered solely the Christmas Eve 2002 incident as his basis for requiring a handgun permit even
though he had no contact with Abbott since the incident. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 871. Woollard
appealed the decision to the Handgun Permit Review Board, who affirmed the decision. Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 465-66. The Board reasoned that Woollard did not offer proof of a current threat occurring beyond his residence, "where he [could] already legally carry a handgun."
Id. at 466.
16 Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 466 (discussing argument Maryland handgun scheme facially
violates Second Amendment and Due Process Clause); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 871 (challenging
constitutionality of Maryland's "good-and-substantial-reason" requirement).
17 Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 471 (concluding right to keep and bear arms extends outside
home). The district court acknowledged that "one should venture into the unmapped reaches of
Second Amendment jurisprudence 'only upon necessity and only then by small degree."' Id. at
469 (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011)). However, in
light of Heller and Masciandaro,the district court reasoned that there was substantial evidence
indicating that the Second Amendment extends beyond the confines of the home. See id. at 46971 (collecting evidence suggesting scope of Second Amendment extends outside home).
18 Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 474 (finding Maryland's "good-and-substantial-reason" requirement overly broad). The district court judge denounced the statute as a rationing system that
would do "no more.. .than... a law indiscriminately limiting the issuance of a permit to every tenth
applicant." See id. He also pointed out that issuing permits to those who demonstrate an increased probability of using them in public is inconsistent with Maryland's stated interest of public safety. Id. As such, the district court declared that "[a] law that burdens the exercise of an
enumerated constitutional right by simply making that right more difficult to exercise cannot be
considered 'reasonably adapted' to a government interest, no matter how substantial that interest
may be." ld. at 475.
19 See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 868 (reversing district court's determination that Maryland's
statute is unconstitutional).
20 See id. at 879-80 (cataloging evidence demonstrating Maryland statute serves Maryland's
interests of public safety and crime prevention).
21 See generally David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1007, 1009-19 (1994) (explaining early English history's influence on drafting of Second
Amendment). King Alfred is credited for instituting the principle that all his subjects were his
soldiers. See id. at 1009 (setting forth earliest roots of principles governing Second Amendment).
Englishmen were charged with supplying their own weapons to carry out their obligation to the
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views of the founding fathers.22 The Second Amendment embodied the
founders' belief that an armed citizenry was the paramount safeguard
against a tyrannical government.23 Until recently, the Second Amendment
had not developed as voluminous a body of case law as other amendments,

crown. See id. at 1009-10 (detailing early English origins of a militia). In 1181, King Henry II
issued the Assize of Arms, which required the possession of weapons by his subjects and forbade
any alienation of weapons. See id. at 1010 (describing formalization of subjects' duties). During
the reign of the Tudors, Henry VIII decreed that fathers had to purchase longbows for their sons
and instruct them in their use. See id. at 1010 (cataloging Tudor contributions to development of
Second Amendment principles). During the Tudor period, the term militia came into use. See id.
at 1011 (stating militia's entrance into English lexicon occurred during reign of Queen Elizabeth).
During the Stuart period, the Catholic King Charles II used the Game Act of 1671, to reserve the
right to hunt only to those earning a certain annual income and to disarm his Protestant adversaries. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593 (2008) (explaining Game Act
caused Englishmen to closely guard their arms); see also Vandercoy, supra, at 1016 (expounding
on Game Act's disarmament provisions). Parliament required William and Mary to adopt the
Declaration of Rights, which in part forbade the crown from disarming Protestants. See Heller,
554 U.S. at 593 (detailing reaction to disarmament and subsequent preventive measures taken to
assure rights); see also Vandercoy, supra, at 1017 (detailing passage of English Declaration of
Rights). In coetaneous legislation, Catholics were assured the right to use firearms in defense of
self and home. Vandercoy, supra, at 1019 (explaining Declaration of Rights and related legislation). The English Declaration of Rights is acknowledged to be the forerunner to the Second
Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 593 (explaining English
Declaration of Rights and its influence on Second Amendment).
22 See Vandercoy, supra note 21, at 1025-26 (summarizing founders' reasoning behind adoption of Second Amendment). While the Federalists, who advocated a strong federal government,
and the Antifederalists, who believed that liberty was best served by decentralized government,
agreed that an armed populace was the best check on government tyranny, they disagreed on several related issues. See id. at 1027 (explaining disagreements between Federalists and Antifederalists over Bill of Rights and checks and balances). The Antifederalists insisted upon a bill of
rights to secure certain rights while Federalists believed that there was no need. See id. at 1027.
23 See id. at 1023-28 (setting forth positions of Antifederalists and Federalists). When the
First Congress convened after the ratification of the Constitution, James Madison brought forth
amendments that would eventually become the Bill of Rights. See id. at 1036 (detailing history
of passage of Second Amendment and Bill of Rights). One of Madison's proposed amendments
declared, "[t]he right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, a well-armed and
well-regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person." David T. Hardy,
Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. PoL'Y 559, 608 (1986) (stating Madison's original proposed Second Amendment for Bill
of Rights); see also Vandercoy, supra note 21, at 1036-37 (providing history of adoption of Bill
of Rights). Madison's proposed Second Amendment was sent to a select committee who tweaked
the proposed amendment so that it read: "[a] well regulated Militia, composed of the body of the
people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms." Vandercoy, supra note 21, at 1037. The Senate deleted the conscientious objector portion along with the
"composed of the body of the people" portion. See Vandercoy, supra note 21, at 1037-38 (explaining Senate's modifications of proposed Second Amendment). The amendment that the
states ratified is the Second Amendment, which is enshrined in the Bill of Rights. See id. at 1038
(detailing ratification of Second Amendment).
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such as the First Amendment and Fourth Amendment, have. 24
The seemingly forgotten Second Amendment was cast into the
spotlight in in the Heller decision, which was the Supreme Court's first
substantial expedition into the amendment.25 Heller contended that the
Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to carry firearms for the
purposes of self-defense while the District of Columbia argued that the
Second Amendment only confers the right to possess firearms in connection with militia service. 26 The Heller Court held that the Second Amend24

See William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43

DuKE L.J. 1236, 1239-40 (1994) (noting dearth of Second Amendment Supreme Court case law
in comparison to other amendments). In two late nineteenth century cases, the Supreme Court
held that the Second Amendment was not applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) ("This is one of the
amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government....");
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) ("The Second Amendment declares that it shall not
be infringed, but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress."). In United States v. Miller, the defendant was indicted for transporting an unregistered
sawed-off shotgun across state lines in violation of the National Firearms Act. United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939) (setting forth facts of case). Miller claimed that the Act violated
his Second Amendment rights. Ild. at 176. The Supreme Court held that the Act was constitutional as a sawed-off shotgun was not "part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use
could contribute to the common defense." Ild. at 178 (finding possession of sawed-off shotgun
not under protections of Second Amendment). In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court held that
a statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms was constitutional, as there was a rational
basis for keeping firearms out of the hands of felons. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65
(1980).
25 See generally Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (noting Heller represents Supreme Court's first "indepth examination of the Second Amendment"). At issue in Heller were Washington, D.C. statutes prohibiting the possession of handguns, making it a crime to possess an unregistered handgun and prohibiting the registration of handguns. See D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12), 72502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2012). However, a person could receive a license to carry a handgun from the chief of police for a one-year period. See D.C. CODE §§ 22-4504(a), 22-4506
(2012). An additional Washington D.C. law required legally owned firearms to either be locked
or disassembled. See D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (2012). Heller, a special police officer, wished to
keep a handgun at home but was denied registration. Heller, 554 U.S. at 574 (setting forth facts
of case). Heller filed suit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia claiming the
District's statutes violated his Second Amendment rights. Id. at 576. The district court dismissed
his complaint but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that
the statutes violated the Second Amendment. ld. (discussing procedural history of case).
26 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 524 (setting forth arguments of parties). Both of the conflicting
views of the meaning of the Second Amendment purport to interpret the amendment through an
originalist lens. See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998
BYU L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1998) ("Despite the animosity that sometimes divides advocates and
opponents of gun control, they share one important characteristic: almost unanimously, they are
constitutional originalists."). The collective right view contends that the purpose of the Second
Amendment was to proscribe Congress from disarming the states' militias and leaving the states
powerless against federal oppression. See Don B. Kates Jr., Handgun Prohibitionand the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 212 (1983) (explaining conflicting interpretations of Second Amendment). They contend the Second Amendment protected the
state militias from the federal government and would be the primary military force of the United
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ment guarantees an individual the right to possess firearms for the purpose
of self-defense in one's home and that the District of Columbia's ban violated Heller's Second Amendment rights.2 Two years later, in McDonald
States. See id. (describing collective right theory of Second Amendment). Such an interpretation
makes the Second Amendment obsolete in modern America. See id. (explaining collective right
view following American Civil War). On the other hand, the individual right advocates point to
the phrase "right of the people," which is also found in the First and Fourth Amendments, and
argue that this phrasing should be interpreted as an individual right, just like the First and Fourth
Amendments are interpreted. See id. at 213. Additionally, the individual right advocates concede
the point that the Framers designed the Second Amendment to protect state militias, but via protecting the individual's right to bear arms. See id. ("[1]t was precisely by protecting the individual
that the Framers intended to protect the militia.").
27 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (announcing holding of case). Writing for the Court, Justice
Scalia began by analyzing and interpreting the text of the Second Amendment. See id. at 579-81.
Justice Scalia began by interpreting the phrase "[r]ight of the people" and noted the similarly
phrased First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, which all secure individual rights. See id. at 579
("All three of these instances unambiguously refer to individual rights, not 'collective' rights, or
rights that may be exercised only through participation in some corporate body."). As such, the
phrase "[r]ight of the people" clashes with the collective right interpretation, which argues that
the Second Amendment was only intended to protect the right to bear arms in connection with
militia service. See id. at 579-81 (arguing collective right view clashes with natural reading of
Second Amendment); see also Kates, Jr., supra note 26, at 212-13 (claiming collective right view
untenable when considering phrasing of Second Amendment). Justice Scalia then interpreted the
substantive portion of the amendment, "to keep and bear arms", the former interpreted as "to have
weapons" and the latter as to carry weapons. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (defining substantive
portions of Second Amendment). The Court noted that several state constitutions enshrined the
right to possess firearms unconnected from militia service. See id. at 584-85 ("[N]ine state constitutional provisions ... enshrined a right of citizens to 'bear arms in defense of themselves and
the state' or 'bear arms in defense of himself and the state."'); see also Eugene Volokh, The
Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793, 793-96 (1998) (comparing Second
Amendment to similar state provisions to illustrate its meaning). The Court then turned to the
beginning phrase, "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State .... "
and interpreted the militia to be a subset of the people and the adjective "well regulated" to mean
that it shall be properly trained. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (interpreting opening language of
Second Amendment); see also Miller, 307 U.S. at 179 ("the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense."). The Court found that once the interpretations were taken together, an individual right to possess firearms for the purposes of selfdefense existed. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 598 (announcing Second Amendment secures right of
people to keep and bear arms). The Court struck down the District's handgun ban as "[t]he prohibition extends.. .to the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most
acute." See id. at 628 (explaining reasoning for striking down handgun prohibition). The Court
declined to announce what level of scrutiny applies to laws burdening the Second Amendment,
instead claiming that the handgun ban would fail to pass constitutional muster "[u]nder any of the
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights ....
See id. (leaving open level of scrutiny to apply to laws burdening Second Amendment rights). However, the
Court ruled out rational basis review. See id. at 628 n.27 (forbidding rational basis review for
Second Amendment claims); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) ("[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end."). In his dissent, Justice
Stevens adopted the collective rights approach and relied on Miller to argue that there was no individual right to possess firearms. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
Miller provided correct interpretation of Second Amendment). Justice Stevens argued that Miller
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v. City of Chicago,2 8 the Supreme Court considered whether the Second
Amendment was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 29 The Court determined that the Second Amendment guarantees a
fundamental right, thus fully binding on the states through incorporation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. o
In the aftermath of Heller and McDonald, lower courts have begun
to traverse the uncharted territory of the Second Amendment." Among
many of Heller's unanswered questions is the appropriate level of scrutiny
held that the Second Amendment protects the right to use firearms for the military purposes and
allows for the legislature to regulate their civilian use. See id. at 677 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("the Miller Court unanimously concluded that the Second Amendment did not apply to the possession of a firearm that did not have 'some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia."'). Justice Scalia retorted that Miller did not hold that the Second Amendment was inapplicable because the defendants possessed weapons estranged from
militia service, but rather the type of weapon-for example, a sawed-off shotgun-was not eligible for Second Amendment protections. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 621-22 (arguing Miller did not
adopt collective right interpretation). The Court also explained that like the other rights found in
the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment is not unlimited. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27
("[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms."). While Heller clarified the core right secured by the
Second Amendment, it did not clarify the entire scope of the Second Amendment. See id. at 635
(declining to "clarify the entire field" of Second Amendment jurisprudence).
28 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
29 See id. at 3026 (setting forth issue to be decided in McDonald). At issue in McDonald was
a Chicago statute and an Oak Park (a Chicago suburb) statute that were nearly identical to the
firearm prohibition scheme in Heller. See id. (outlining facts of case). Chicago and Oak Park
argued that the Second Amendment had no application to the States and that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights to the States, if those rights are
essential to a civilized country. See id. at 3028 ("If it is possible to imagine a civilized country
that does not recognize the right ... that right is not protected by due process."). McDonald asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment and implored the
court to reject its narrow interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See id. (stating
McDonald's arguments that Second Amendment applies to states).
30 See id. at 3047 (holding right recognized in Heller fully applicable to states). While the
question of whether the Second Amendment is applicable to the states appeared to be answered
by Cruikshank and Presser,they predated the Supreme Court's process of selective incorporation
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. (explaining why issue was
still one of first impression for Supreme Court). The court rejected Chicago and Oak Park's civilized society argument. See id. at 3034 ("[T]he . . . inquir[y] [is] whether a particular Bill of
Rights guarantee is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice."). The
Court found that the right recognized in Heller was fundamental and thus fully binding upon the
states. See id. at 3046 ("Under our precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental from
an American perspective ... that guarantee is fully binding on the States and thus limits ... their
ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values.").
31 See NRA of America v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 700 F.3d 185, 211
(5th Cir. 2012) (holding federal ban of sale of guns to people under age of twenty-one constitutional); Bateman v. Perdue, 881 F. Supp. 2d 709, 716 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (holding ban on possession of firearms outside home during state of emergency unconstitutional).
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32
to apply to laws that burden a person's Second Amendment rights.
Courts are now beginning to tussle with whether Heller has any application

32

See sources cited supra note 27 and accompanying text (noting Heller Court's refusal to

announce level of applicable scrutiny). The Fourth Circuit has held that intermediate scrutiny
applies to laws that regulate rather than prohibit firearms, while strict scrutiny would apply to
laws burdening the core guarantee of the Heller right. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d
673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (adopting intermediate scrutiny as level of scrutiny for laws not burdening core Second Amendment protections). Under intermediate scrutiny, "the government must
demonstrate ... that there is a 'reasonable fit' between the challenged regulation and a 'substantial' government objective." See id. at 683 (explaining requirements needed to survive intermediate scrutiny). The nexus between the law and the objective need only be reasonable, not a perfect
fit. See id. ("Significantly, intermediate scrutiny places the burden of establishing the required fit
squarely upon the government."). In Chester, the defendant claimed that that a federal law banning the possession of firearms by those convicted of domestic violence offenses violated his
Second Amendment rights. See id. at 677 (detailing legal arguments of defendant). In analyzing
Chester's Second Amendment claim, the Fourth Circuit adopted the two-part approach promulgated by the Third Circuit. See id. at 680 (approving Third Circuit's approach to analyzing Second Amendment issues); see also United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)
(establishing two-prong approach to analyzing Second Amendment claims). Under the Third
Circuit's approach, the court must perform the following inquiry:
[D]etermine whether the conduct at issue was understood to be within the scope of the
right at the time of ratification. If it was not, then the challenged law is valid. If the
challenged regulation burdens conduct that was within the scope of the Second
Amendment as historically understood, then [the court] move[s] to the second step of
applying an appropriate form of means-end scrutiny.
See Chester, 628 F.3d at 680 (explaining process of analyzing Second Amendment claims). The
Chester Court declined to apply strict scrutiny to Chester's claim because, although the law burdened his right to possess firearms in his home, the core right of the Second Amendment is for
law-abiding citizens, not people like Chester-domestic violence misdemeanants-thus the court
applied intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 683 (explaining reasoning behind applying intermediate
scrutiny). The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to grant the government the opportunity to defend the law knowing the applicable level of scrutiny. See id. (announcing holding of case). The
Fourth Circuit subsequently was afforded the opportunity to apply intermediate scrutiny to a Second Amendment challenge to a law prohibiting the possession of firearms in National Parks. See
United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 465 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing constitutional challenge to federal law). Unlike the defendant in Chester,Masciandaro did not have a criminal record at the time of his arrest. See id. at 470. The Fourth Circuit found that while strict scrutiny
would apply to any law burdening the right to possess firearms to defend one's home, intermediate scrutiny would apply to laws burdening the right to possess firearms outside the home. See id.
("But, as we move outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited, because public safety interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense."). The Fourth Circuit held
that the law passed constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 471 (announcing
holding of case). However, several courts abstain from the first prong of the test, and assume the
claimed right exists. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 40, Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1443), 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2646, at *39-40 (collecting cases
where court declines to issue ruling as to first prong); see also Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester,
701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[T]he Amendment must have some application .... Our analysis proceeds on this assumption."); Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 475 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in
part) (declining to expound on whether Heller has any application outside home).
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outside of the home. 3

33 See Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md. 2011) (finding Second Amendment
does
not extend beyond home); see also Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 88 (considering whether right recognized in Heller extends outside home). The court in Kachalsky was called upon to consider
whether New York's handgun permit regulations violated the Second Amendment by requiring
applicants to demonstrate "proper cause" to possess a concealed handgun in public. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 88 (stating issue to be decided). The Second Circuit noted that history and
case law offered conflicting views on the constitutionality of such statutes. See id. at 90-91 (cataloging sources offering differing views on constitutionality of possession of handguns outside
home). The Second Circuit adopted the two-part test set forth in Marzzarella, Chester, and Masciandaro, and applied intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 93-94 (setting forth standard of review).
The Second Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny because the law fell outside the core guarantee
of the Second Amendment as recognized in Heller. See id. at 94 (explaining reasoning for applying intermediate scrutiny). The Second Circuit found that New York's handgun licensing scheme
survived intermediate scrutiny as it was "substantially related" to New York's interests in public
safety and crime prevention. See id. at 98. (stating holding of case). But see James Bishop, Note,
Hidden or on the Hip: The Right(s) to Carry After Heller, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 907, 914 (2012)
(criticizing Kachalsky and New York's proper cause requirement). "Mr. Kachalsky's application
demonstrates the same nebulous concern about unlikely catastrophes that leads people to buy life
insurance and burglar alarms ....
See Bishop, supra, at 915; see also John R. Lott, Jr., A Second
Amendment Quartet: Heller and McDonald in the Lower Courts: What a Balancing Test Will
Show for Right-to-Carry Laws, 71 MD. L. REV. 1205, 1206 (2012) (arguing regulations banning
publicly carrying firearms cannot pass intermediate or strict scrutiny). Of twenty-nine studies by
economists and criminologists, eighteen found that shall-issue laws, which give local officials
less discretion to reject firearm permit applications, cause a drop in crime, ten found no effect on
crime, and one found a temporary increase in aggravated assaults. See Lott, Jr., supra, at 1206
(collecting results of studies on shall-issue laws). "If right-to-carry laws either reduce crime or
leave it unchanged ... regulations prohibiting people from carrying concealed handguns cannot
withstand either strict or intermediate scrutiny." See id. Some courts have found that there is no
right under the Second Amendment to carry a concealed firearm. See Peterson v. Martinez, 707
F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he concealed carrying of firearms falls outside the scope of
the Second Amendment's guarantee .... ). Similarly, in Drake v. Filko, the Third Circuit upheld
a New Jersey statute requiring an applicant to show a "justifiable need" for a handgun permit.
724 F.3d 426, 440 (3d Cir. 2013). However, the Third Circuit differed substantially in its reasoning, finding that the "justifiable need" requirement for a handgun permit falls outside the scope of
the Second Amendment. See id. at 431-32. The Drake court noted that the requirement's origins
date back to a 1924 New Jersey law. See id. at 432. The Drake court categorized the requirement
as a "longstanding regulation that enjoys presumptive constitutionality under the teachings articulated in Heller and expanded upon in our Court's precedent." ld. at 434 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the Third Circuit applied the second prong of the Marzzarella test as the "issues presented to us in this new era of Second Amendment jurisprudence are of critical importance." Id.
at 434. The court found that the law passed intermediate scrutiny despite the fact that "New Jersey has not presented us with much evidence to show how or why its legislators arrived at this
predictive judgment. Id. at 437. New Jersey's counsel acknowledged that "there is no available
commentary which would clarify whether or not the Legislature considered statistical information
to support the public safety purpose of the State's Carry Permit Law." ld. Despite the lack of
evidentiary support, the Third Circuit expressed deference to the "New Jersey legislators, [who]
have made a policy judgment that the state can best protect public safety by allowing only those
qualified individuals who can demonstrate a 'justifiable need' to carry a handgun to do so." ld. at
439. In his dissent, Judge Hardiman argued that the court erred by finding that the "justifiable
need" requirement to be outside the scope of the Second Amendment. See id. at 446 (Hardiman,
J., dissenting) ("[I]nterpreting the Second Amendment to extend outside the home is merely a
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commonsense application of the legal principle established in Heller and reiterated in McDonald:
that 'the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of selfdefense."' (quoting McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026)). Judge Hardiman also argued that the majority wrongly asserted that such a requirement dates back to the early twentieth century, as it was
not until the 1960s that New Jersey regulated open-carry as well as concealed carry. Id. at 451.
The majority's application of intermediate scrutiny was also in error in Judge Hardiman's opinion. Id. at 453-54 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). The majority's application was flawed in that it
excused New Jersey's lack of evidentiary support and deferred to the legislature, thus applying
rational basis scrutiny. See id. at 456-57 ("By deferring absolutely to the New Jersey legislature,
the majority abdicates its duty to apply intermediate scrutiny and effectively applies the rational
basis test, contrary to the Supreme Court's explicit rejection of that test in the Second Amendment context."). Other federal judges have held that the Second Amendment right recognized in
Heller extends beyond the home. See Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 467-68 (Niemeyer J., writing
separately as to Part III.B.). Judge Niemeyer noted that Heller declared the right to possess handguns for self-defense is "most acute" in the home, implying that there is a Second Amendment
right in places that are less acute. See id. (Niemeyer J., writing separately as to Part III.B.). Additionally, Judge Niemeyer observed that laws prohibiting firearms from sensitive areas would be
redundant if the right to keep and bear arms was confined to the home. See id. (Niemeyer J., writing separately as to Part III.B.); see also Michael C. Dorf, Symposium, District of Columbia v.
Heller: Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV.
225, 227 (2008) (arguing Heller "clearly contemplates the carrying of firearms outside the
home"). A federal district court has cited Judge Niemeyer's reasoning with approval in finding
that the Second Amendment's scope reaches outside the home. See United States v. Weaver, No.
2:09-cr-00222, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29613, at *12 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 7, 2012) ("While it is true
that the Fourth Circuit has so far stopped short of expressly recognizing a Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms outside the home, this Court has no such hesitation."). The Weaver
court admonished other courts for dragging their feet in recognizing the Second Amendment extends outside the home. See Weaver, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29613, at *14 n.7 ("The fact that
courts may be reluctant to recognize the protection of the Second Amendment outside the home
says more about the courts than the Second Amendment. Limiting this fundamental right to the
home would be akin to limiting the protections of First Amendment freedom of speech to political speech or college campuses."). In contrast to Kachalsky, the Seventh Circuit found a handgun
permit scheme in Illinois unconstitutional and held that the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear firearms extends outside the home. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir.
2012) (reversing lower court determination that Second Amendment does not extend outside
home). The Moore court noted that the phrase "bear arms" infers that the right to possess firearms extends beyond the home. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 936. The Moore court criticized Kachalsky's dichotomy between self-defense in the home and self-defense in public. See Moore,
702 F.3d at 941 ("The interest in self-protection is as great outside as inside the home."). Cases
from the nineteenth century provide useful guidance for courts seeking to define the contours of
the Second Amendment. See State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 619 (1840) ("[T]he Legislature cannot
inhibit the citizen from bearing arms openly, because it authorizes him to bear them for the purposes of defending himself and the State, and it is only when carried openly, that they can be efficiently used for defence."); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (declaring law prohibiting the
carrying of firearms openly unconstitutional); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt). 90, 90-92
(1822) ("Not merely all legislative acts, which purport to take it away; but all which diminish or
impair it, as it existed when the constitution was formed, are void .... [I]t is the right to bear arms
in defence of the citizens and the state, that is secured by the constitution, and whatever restrains
the full and complete exercise of that right, though not an entire destruction of it, is forbidden by
the explicit language of the constitution."); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 187-88
(1871) (holding Tennessee law prohibiting both concealed and open carrying of weapons unconstitutional). But see State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 27 (1842) ("It inhibits only the wearing of certain arms concealed. This is simply a regulation as to the manner of bearing such arms as are
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In Woollard v. Gallagher, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered whether Maryland's "good-and-substantialreason" requirement for the issuance of a handgun permit withstood intermediate scrutiny.34 The court began its analysis by distinguishing the Maryland statutory scheme of regulating the carrying of handguns in public
from Heller's "core protection:" the right to keep and bear arms for the
purposes of defense of hearth and home.3 5 Like many sister circuits, the
Fourth Circuit applied the two-prong test to Woollard's Second Amendment claim.16 However, the court declined to rule on the first prongassuming without deciding that the Second Amendment extends outside the
home-and moved to the analysis of Woollard's Second Amendment claim
under the second prong.3 The court relied on their ruling in Masciandaro
to apply intermediate scrutiny to Maryland's handgun permitting scheme."
In applying intermediate scrutiny, the Fourth Circuit credited Maryland's
argument that the permitting scheme served its coexistent interests of public safety and crime prevention.3 9
The court found that Maryland proved a reasonable fit between its
interests-public safety and crime prevention-and the "good-andsubstantial-reason" requirement by limiting the number of handguns in
public.4 0 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit criticized the district court's char-

specified. The practice of so bearing them the legislative department of the government has determined to be wrong, or at least inconsistent with sound policy.").
34 See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 2013) (announcing issue on appeal).
31 Id. at 874-76 (distinguishing between statutes at issue in Heller and statutes at issue in instant case). The court reiterated the equivocality surrounding the reach of the Second Amendment. See id.at 874 (citing authority lamenting lack of guidance on determining scope of Second
Amendment).
36 ld. at 874-75 (noting several sister circuits apply two-prong test to Second Amendment
claims).
37 ld. at 875-76 (explaining reasoning for not addressing first prong of test). The court
claimed to "hew to a judicious course" by declining consideration of whether the "good-andsubstantial-reason" requirement implicated the Second Amendment. Id. at 876. Instead, the court
assumed without deciding that the Second Amendment extends outside the home. ld. By doing
so, it also assumed that Woollard's rights were infringed by Maryland's "good-and- substantialreason" requirement. ld.
38 ld. (citing Masciandarocase as basis for applying intermediate scrutiny).
39 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 877 (approving Maryland's argument that public safety and crime
prevention constitute substantial government interests). The court took note of several troubling
statistics: (1) violent crime in Maryland has increased exponentially; (2) the majority of violent
crimes involved handguns leading to increased deaths and injuries; (3) current law has not curtailed the violence; and (4) more gun regulations are needed to curtail the violence, ld. at 876-77.
Additionally, in 2009, nearly all firearm homicides- 97.4%-involved a handgun. ld. at 877.
40 ld. at 880. The court remarked that even without a permit, Woollard could still have a
handgun in his house and transport it to and from several places, such as repair shops and target
ranges. Id. at 879. In finding a reasonable fit between Maryland's interests of public safety and
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acterization of the permitting scheme as a "rationing system" that would
not protect the public from all dangers posed by handguns. 4 ' The Fourth
Circuit also criticized the district court for what it saw as a "misapplication
of the intermediate scrutiny standard., 42 Thus, the Fourth Circuit found that
Maryland's "good-and-substantial-reason" requirement passed intermediate
scrutiny as it is reasonably tailored to Maryland's interests in public safety
and crime prevention.4 3
In Woollard v. Gallagher,the Fourth Circuit incorrectly applied the
two-prong test for Second Amendment claims to Maryland's handgun permitting scheme. 44 Instead of assuming the Heller right extends beyond the
home, the Fourth Circuit should have discussed the relevant case law and
made a definitive ruling on whether the right actually extends beyond the
home.4 5 The court described its refusal to consider the first prong of the
test as an example of "judicious" restraint, presumably due to the "vast ter-

crime prevention and the "good-and-substantial-reason" requirement, the court cited Maryland's
arguments that the requirement: (1) decreases the availability of handguns susceptible to theft; (2)
decreases the probability of confrontations turning fatal due to the presence of handguns; and (3)
curtails the presence of handguns in police stops. Id. at 879-80.
41 Id. at 881 (criticizing district court's decision). The Fourth Circuit also expressed
deference to the legislature on determining the best course in balancing gun rights with public safety.
Id. ("The duty of the courts is to ensure that the legislature's policy choice substantially serves a
significant governmental interest.").
42 Id. at 882 (denouncing district court's application of intermediate scrutiny). The Fourth
Circuit argued that the district court applied a test that was closer to strict scrutiny than to intermediate scrutiny. Id.
43 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882-83 (announcing holding of court).
44 See id. at 874-75 (applying two-prong test to Maryland handgun permit scheme); see also
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (adopting two-part approach promulgated by Third Circuit); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (establishing
two-prong approach to analyzing Second Amendment claims). The Fourth Circuit's error lies in
its refusal to address the first prong of the test-whether the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 875 (discussing reasoning for not
ruling on first prong of test); see also Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir.
2012) (assuming without deciding Second Amendment extends outside home). Merely assuming
the Second Amendment extends beyond the home and not issuing a ruling one way or the other
allowed the court to ignore prior case law dealing with the Second Amendment beyond the home.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 40, Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No.
12-1443), 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2646, at *43-47. Thus, this assumed right to possess
firearms beyond the home does not have an iota of substantive content to it. See id. at *43-47
(No. 12-1443). The hollow assumed right to possess firearms beyond the home can then be easily
repudiated. See id. at *43-47 (No. 12-1443).
45 See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 875-76 n.5 (noting courts that have issued ruling on whether
Heller right extends outside home). Footnote five merely acknowledges that some courts have
found that the Second Amendment secures the right to carry a firearm in public, while others have
found it does not. Id. The footnote, and the rest of the decision for that matter, is devoid of any
analysis of the merits of either position, which is expected due to the court's assumption. Id.
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ra incognita" of the Second Amendment's boundaries.4 6
While the scope of the Second Amendment outside the core right is
indeed unplumbed, Heller and McDonald have provided an opportunity for
courts to explore the uncharted boundaries of the Amendment. 4 Doing so

46

See id.at 875-76 (declining to rule on first prong and instead assuming existence of right);

cases cited supra note 5 (noting ambiguity surrounding boundaries of Second Amendment); see
also United States v. Weaver, No. 2:09-cr-00222, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29613, at *13-14 n.5
(S.D.W. Va. Mar. 7, 2012) (observing Fourth Circuit has expressly declined to address first prong
of test on several occasions). The Weaver Court argued that "constitutional avoidance" is unwarranted when federal courts are directly presented with a claim that a law violates the claimant's
Second Amendment rights. Weaver, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29613, at *13-14 n.5; see also United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011) (Niemeyer, J., writing for court except as to Part II.B) (arguing court obligated to address issue despite concerns of judicial restraint). Writing separately as to the issue of constitutional avoidance in Masciandaro,Judge
Niemeyer asserted that courts are obliged to rule on claims of a law violating the claimant's constitutional rights. See Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 468 (Niemeyer, J., writing for court except as to
Part II.B). Moreover, he contended that the complex issue of whether the Heller right extends
beyond the home is one the Supreme Court wishes to develop through the Court of Appeals. See
id.Mere assumption of the right without any discussion or analysis of relevant case law and statutes does nothing to develop and resolve the issue. See id.
47 See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (arguing "no turning back by the
lower federal courts" in wake of Heller and McDonald); see also Dorf, supra note 33, at 227 (arguing Heller "clearly contemplates" right to carry outside of home). In Heller, Justice Scalia referenced a nineteenth century senator's speech lauding the rifle as the primary defense of the frontiersmen against wild animals and hostile Native Americans. See District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 609 (2008) (quoting Senator Sumner's "Bleeding Kansas" speech). It would be
rather unlikely for the nineteenth century frontiersman to chance upon a wild animal or a hostile
Native American in his or her home, implying that the frontiersman, and citizens in general, had
the right to use firearms outside the home to defend himself. See Dorf, supra note 33, at 227; see
also Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89 ("[A]s Justice Stevens's dissent in Heller and Defendants in this
case before us acknowledge,... the Amendment must have some application in the very different
context of the public possession of firearms."). Furthermore, the plain meaning of the Second
Amendment as interpreted by the Heller Court lends credence to the right having an application
beyond the home. See U.S. CONST. amend. II. (setting forth text of Second Amendment); Heller,
554 U.S. at 584 ("At the time of the founding, as now, to 'bear' meant to 'carry."'). To carry
weapons implies that such carrying is occurring outside the home as the Heller Court defined
"keep arms" as to "have weapons." See Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (defining key terms of Second
Amendment). Thus, reading the Second Amendment as conferring the right to carry within one's
home but not in public would be a bizarre interpretation. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 936 ("To speak
of 'bearing' arms within one's home would at all times have been an awkward usage."); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89 n.10 ("The plain text of the Second Amendment does not limit the right to
bear arms to the home."). Some courts and commentators point to Heller's proclamation that
"nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding .. .laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings ..."as additional support for the Second Amendment extending beyond the home. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626;
see also Dorf, supra note 33, at 228 (asserting proclamation implies right to carry extends beyond
home); Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 468 (Niemeyer, J., writing for court except as to Part II.B) ("If
the Second Amendment right were confined to self-defense in the home, the Court would not
have needed to express a reservation for 'sensitive places' outside of the home."). Additionally,
Heller recognized hunting and militia service are also engrained within the Second Amendment,
neither of which is a homebound activity. Heller, 554 U.S. at 598-99 (describing purposes be-
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would illustrate that there is a basis for the application of the right recognized in Heller outside the home. 8 Such an analysis would grant the right
a substantive backbone that its assumed kin lacks, making it not so easily
repudiated by the courts4 9
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's misapplication of the two-prong
test poisoned its application
of means-end scrutiny-more specifically, in. 50
termediate scrutiny.
While the Fourth Circuit rebuked the district court
for its application of intermediate scrutiny-which was more akin to strict
scrutiny in its estimation-its application of intermediate scrutiny more
closely resembled rational basis review. 5 This misapplication can be seen

hind Second Amendment).
48 See sources cited supra note 47 (detailing support for right to carry beyond home in Heller). For example, Judge Niemeyer's analysis in Masciandaro finding that the Second Amendment extends outside the home has been approved by other courts. See Bateman v. Perdue, 881
F. Supp. 2d 709, 713-14 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (quoting Judge Niemeyer's separate analysis in finding
Second Amendment right extends beyond home); Weaver, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29613, at *1213 (citing Judge Niemeyer's separate section with approval); Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 469
("[T]he Court finds a ready guide in Judge Niemeyer's analysis in Masciandaro."). Additionally,
there are nineteenth century cases that support the Second Amendment's applicability outside the
home. See cases cited supra note 33 (detailing nineteenth century cases interpreting right to carry
laws). However, present day case law is split between cases finding that there is such a right to
carry, and others finding laws burdening the right to carry are constitutional. Compare Woollard,
863 F. Supp. 2d at *36 (finding Maryland handgun permitting scheme violates right to carry), and
Moore, 702 F.3d at 942 (striking down Illinois ban on concealed carry), and Bateman, 881 F.
Supp. 2d at 716 (finding North Carolina emergency declaration laws violate right to carry under
Second Amendment), and Weaver, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29613, at *11 ("While it is true that
the Fourth Circuit has so far stopped short of expressly recognizing a Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms outside the home, this Court has no such hesitation."), with Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1215-16 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding concealed carry not protected by Second
Amendment), and Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 101 (upholding New York's handgun permitting
scheme). The evidence demonstrates a plethora of existing law that the Fourth Circuit declined to
consider in its determination that Maryland's handgun permitting scheme was constitutional. See
cases cited supra note 47 (tracing evidence supporting right to carry under Second Amendment).
49 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 40, Schrader, 704 F.3d 980 (No. 12-1443), 2013 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2646, at *40 (asserting assumptions under first prong make Second Amend-

ment claims easily disposable).
50 See id.("It is far from obvious why intermediate scrutiny would be nearly presumptively
fatal to claimants asserting a fundamental right."). The Woollard court echoed other courts' sentiment that as one moves outside the home, firearm rights are more limited due to public safety
concerns. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 880-81 (explaining assumed right to carry limited by public
safety concerns); see also Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96 (noting state's substantial interest in regulating public carrying of handguns); Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 470 (discussing out-of-the-home/inthe-home dichotomy). The Seventh Circuit took issue with this distinction and its implication
that something less than strict scrutiny should apply to the challenged law. See Moore, 702 F.3d
at 941 ("But the interest in self-protection is as great outside as inside the home.").
51 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 40, Schrader, 704 F.3d 980 (No. 12-1443), 2013 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2646, at *43 (criticizing courts employing intermediate scrutiny standard in
name only); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) ("[I]f a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long
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in the Fourth Circuit's perfunctory analysis of Maryland's evidence offered
in support of its handgun-permitting scheme.5 2
In Woollard v. Gallagher,the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether Maryland's handgun permitting scheme requiring an applicant to show a "good-and-substantial-reason" for issuance of a permit
violated the Second Amendment. The Fourth Circuit erroneously abstained
as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end."); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673,
682 (4th Cir. 2010) (adopting intermediate scrutiny as level of scrutiny for laws not burdening
core Second Amendment protections). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit accepted the hypothetical evidence offered by Maryland in support of its handgun-permitting scheme and expressed deference
toward the state legislature. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 879-81; see also Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d
426, 454 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) ("Our role is to evaluate the State's proffered
evidence, not to accept reflexively its litigation position."); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 40,
Schrader, 704 F.3d 980 (No. 12-1443), 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2646, at *41-45 (arguing
courts have been misapplying intermediate scrutiny to Second Amendment claims).
52 See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 879-80; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 40, Schrader,
704 F.3d 980 (No. 12-1443), 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2646, at *41-45 (arguing courts have
been misapplying intermediate scrutiny to Second Amendment claims). While Maryland's evidence is rationally related to its undoubtedly legitimate end of public safety and crime prevention,
one would be hard pressed to argue that the handgun permitting scheme is a "reasonable fit"
where the empirical data is inconclusive at best or favors public carrying of firearms at worst.
See Moore, 702 F.3d at 939 ("In sum, the empirical literature on the effects of allowing the carriage of guns in public fails to establish a pragmatic defense of the Illinois law [banning concealed carry]."); see also Lott, Jr., supra note 33, at 1206 ("There have been a total of 29 peer
reviewed studies by economists and criminologists, 18 supporting the hypothesis that shall-issue
laws reduce crime, 10 not finding any significant effect on crime ... and [one] .. .finding that
right-to-carry laws temporarily increase ... aggravated assaults."). If the public carriage of firearms either reduces crime, or has no discernible impact, such laws severely burdening the right to
carry cannot pass constitutional muster. See Lott, Jr., supra note 33, at 1206 (asserting laws burdening right to carry should fail under any intermediate and strict scrutiny). Such empirical analysis is nowhere to be found in the Woollard court's consideration of Maryland's proffered evidence. See Woollard, 712 F.3d 865, at 879-80. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit was wrong to
criticize the district court's characterization of the Maryland handgun permitting scheme as a "rationing system." See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 880-81 (decrying district court's characterization of
handgun permitting scheme); see also Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 474 (denouncing regulations
as rationing system with the goal of "simply ...reduc[ing] the total number of firearms carried
outside of the home by limiting the privilege to those who can demonstrate 'good reason' beyond
a general desire for self-defense."). While it may not be the intent of Maryland to ration the
number of publicly carried handguns, it is beyond a shadow of a doubt the impact of the scheme.
See Lott, Jr., supra note 33, at 1209 ("Maryland has granted concealed handgun permits, but obtaining permits has been exceedingly difficult. In 2007, the last year for which data is available
from Maryland, only 36,755 permits were issued, implying merely 0.86 percent of the adult populating had permits."). "A law that burdens the exercise of an enumerated constitutional right by
simply making that right more difficult to exercise cannot be considered 'reasonably adapted' to a
government interest, no matter how substantial that interest may be." Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d
at 475 (criticizing Maryland's scheme for too broadly restricting right to carry); see also Drake,
724 F.3d at 455-56 ("[I]t
is obvious that the justifiable need requirement functions as a rationing
system... [e]ven assuming that.., fewer guns means less crime, a rationing system that burdens
the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right by simply making that right more difficult to
exercise cannot be considered reasonably adapted to a governmental interest because it burdens
the right too broadly.").
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from addressing whether Woollard's claim was protected by the Second
Amendment. Furthermore, its application of means-end scrutiny more
closely resembled rational basis scrutiny than the intermediate scrutiny it
purported to apply. While the boundaries of the Second Amendment have
yet to be adequately defined and the Supreme Court may wish for the lower
federal courts to further develop the issue, the lower courts' disinclination
to traverse this "vast terra incognita" coupled with their disparate analyses
may thrust the Supreme Court to address whether the Heller right extends
beyond the home sooner than it may like.
Lincoln A. Rose

